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The potential of a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) to contribute 
to gender equality is a contested issue amongst feminist schol-
ars. This article focuses on the nature of BIG as an individual-
ly-based payment to explore its potential for reducing gender 
equality, specifically intra-household inequalities in material or 
financial welfare; economic autonomy; psychological well-being; 
and time allocation, especially leisure time and time spent in 
household and care work. We employ a gender analysis of exist-
ing BIG pilots/schemes as well as close substitutes (e.g., universal 
child benefits) to assess some of the key claims about the effects 
of a basic income (BI) on gendered inequality. We also present 
findings from empirical work on intra-household allocation and 
decision-making which underscore the role of independent income. 
The article finds some support for BIG as a feminist proposal 
with respect to mitigating intra-household inequality, but con-
cludes that further empirical research is needed to argue persua-
sively for BIG as an instrument for furthering gender equality.
Key words: Basic Income Guarantee, gender, feminism, indepen-
dent income, intra-household inequality
Basic income guarantee (BIG) proposals have gained 
renewed cross-national interest in both academic and policy 
circles in recent years (Caputo, 2012; Standing, 2014). In the UK, 
a basic income has been supported by the Green party and the 
non-partisan Citizen's Income Trust, while in other countries, 
such as Finland and France, proposals for basic income pilots 
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and experiments are on the agenda. A BIG can be defined as 
"an income paid by a political community to all its members on 
an individual basis, without means test or work requirement" 
(Van Parijs, 2004, p. 8). Although the specifics of any particular 
basic income proposal vary, the core characteristics of a BIG 
are:
• Universality—it is paid to everyone in the population
• Individuality—it is paid to each adult rather than as 
a single household payment
• Unconditionality—it is paid without conditions 
regarding family or employment status
• Delivery as a cash benefit
BIG has been advocated for a variety of reasons, including 
but not limited to the promotion of gender equality. However, 
the question of whether to regard BIG as a feminist proposal 
remains divisive. Advocates have pointed to the potential for 
BIG to correct the paid work bias of contemporary social se-
curity systems and to increase women's economic autonomy 
and power within the household (Fitzpatrick, 1999; McKay, 
2001, 2005; Zelleke, 2011), as well as to contribute to a more 
inclusive feminism via its anti-poverty and anti-exploitation 
characteristics (McLean, 2015). Critics have argued that BIG 
will do nothing to directly challenge the gendered division of 
labor and may well reinforce it (Gheaus, 2008; Robeyns, 2001). 
In her introduction to the Basic Income Studies special issue 
"Should Feminists Endorse Basic Income?" Robeyns (2008) 
specifically calls for a shift in an empiricist direction (analyz-
ing the specifics of implementation and examining the avail-
able evidence) in order to help resolve some of the continu-
ing controversy regarding basic income among feminists. This 
article responds to Robeyn's call by examining the available 
evidence of existing BIG pilots/schemes as well as close sub-
stitutes (e.g., universal child benefits) to assess some of the key 
claims about the effects of a BIG on gendered inequality. In 
addition, the article discusses the evidence base with regard to 
key areas of intra-household inequalities in income and expen-
ditures, living standards, well-being, and time use.
The broad areas of family and household dynamics with a 
particular focus on gender have been the subject of intensive 
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research from a wide variety of disciplines. A focus on gender 
and poverty draws attention to the interactions between the 
family, the labor market, and the state, and exposes the gen-
dered nature of the separation between the public and private 
spheres. Central to this has been the division between the 
private and the public sphere and the use of collective units of 
analysis. In conventional analyses of poverty and income in-
equality, the household is taken as the unit of analysis, but this 
neglects what goes on within households. The household is in 
effect treated as a "black box," with little or no attention paid 
to differences among household members in access to and 
control over resources. In taking the household as the income 
recipient unit, it is assumed resources are shared so that each 
individual in a given household has the same standard of 
living. However, if different individuals within households 
actually experience different levels of well-being, this could 
have major implications for our understanding of poverty, for 
the way anti-poverty policies are framed, or for the purposes 
of this paper, the potential impact of a BIG scheme. 
There is now a substantial theoretical and empirical litera-
ture investigating within-household inequalities, focusing on 
such issues as the allocation of resources, income pooling, fi-
nancial decision-making, expenditure, and material outcomes 
(Bonke & Browning, 2009; Cantillon, 2013; Lee & Pocock, 2007; 
Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997; Phipps & Burton, 1998; 
Stocks, Díaz-Martínez, & Halleröd, 2007; Vogler & Pahl, 1994). 
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the control and 
allocation of resources within the household, particularly in 
terms of living standards of individual household members, 
but also in terms of the decision making processes within it. 
The Individual Nature of a Basic Income  
and Intra-household Inequality 
Many BIG advocates (e.g., Bambrick, 2006; Birnbaum, 
2012; Fitzpatrick, 1999; Zelleke, 2011) have emphasized the 
unconditionality of a BIG as the crucial means by which it 
supports gender equality goals, arguing that its neutrality re-
garding paid employment or unpaid caregiving avoids the 
problem of choosing between systems of social security which 
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require labor market participation and therefore devalue do-
mestic and care work, or systems which reward such work but 
cement separate spheres of labor for men and women. 
However, an additional key thread underpinning many 
arguments is the importance of a BIG as an individual benefit, 
contributing to gender equality via economic independence for 
women (Elgarte, 2008; Fitzpatrick, 1999; McKay, 2005; Parker, 
1993; Robeyns, 2001). The individual nature of a BIG is espe-
cially crucial given accumulating empirical evidence on intra-
household economic inequalities, related power differentials 
between men and women, and the importance of the recipient 
of income coming into the household (Bennett & Sung, 2013; 
Cantillon & Nolan, 2001; Goode, Callender, & Lister, 1998; 
Lundberget al., 1997; Nyman & Reinikainen, 2007). Individual 
benefits means that the entirety of household income does not 
necessarily go directly to a single household breadwinner, nor 
does the value of the benefit decrease by virtue of being in a 
coupled relationship, which penalizes low-income women for 
their partner's earnings, even if they do not benefit from them 
equally. A BIG treats women as citizens in their own right, 
rather than as dependents within a household (Pateman, 2004). 
The general argument that BIG could facilitate a reduction 
in intra-household inequality can be broken down into four 
possible effects. First is the effect on the financial or material 
welfare of women. A key line of inquiry on within-household 
dynamics has been to investigate differences in living stan-
dards among members of couples (Cantillon & Nolan, 2001; 
Nyman & Reinikainen, 2007). In relation to personal spend-
ing money, for example, Nyman found that in Sweden women 
have insufficient access to personal spending money more 
often than men, at 63 versus 51 per cent respectively (Nyman, 
2002, p. 18). In the UK, Pahl (1989, p. 148) found that hus-
bands were more likely than wives to have personal spending 
money and to have more to spend on themselves. Vogler and 
Pahl (1994, p. 281) found that 58 per cent of couples had equal 
access to personal spending, in 12 per cent the man had more 
and in 4 percent the woman had more (Vogler & Pahl, 1994). 
A consistent theme of the literature on distribution of re-
sources within the family is the role which the wife's own 
income might play. In a study based on individual-level 
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non-monetary indicators across a wide range of goods and ac-
tivities, the average gap between the wife's and the husband's 
deprivation index score was consistently narrower where the 
wife had an income of her own. Further, there was a positive 
correlation between the reduction in the gap between hus-
bands' and wives' scores on the deprivation index and the 
wife's income level, such that the gap decreased as the wife's 
independent income increased (Cantillon, 2013; Cantillon & 
Nolan, 1998). 
Paying a basic income to all individuals irrespective of 
work status or household income could, in theory, raise living 
standards and improve access to economic resources within 
the household, particularly for those who otherwise would 
not have an independent source of income, or whose income 
is lower, such that there would be a within-household redis-
tributive effect that would benefit women, who are more likely 
to be in such a position (Callan, Nolan, Walsh, McBride, & 
Nestor, 2000; Cantillon & Nolan, 2001; Lundberg et al., 1997).
On the other hand, material welfare and an independent 
income can also be linked to labor force participation. A key 
critique of the argument that BIG would serve to reduce intra-
household inequalities between men and women rests pre-
cisely on the fact that because BIG is an unconditional cash 
benefit, it would lessen incentives to paid employment, es-
pecially for women, given their relatively weaker attachment 
to the labor force compared to men, and thus counteract any 
of the beneficial effects on gender equality highlighted previ-
ously (Gheaus, 2008; Robeyns, 2001). Mothers, in particular, 
face additional hurdles regarding employment, such that cash 
payments could encourage mothers, especially those with low 
skills or in low paying jobs, to exit the labor market in favor 
of informal care in the home. Further, there are potential dis-
incentives for married women which may occur as a result 
of taxing the first dollar of income beyond the basic income 
(Bambrick, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 1999). This depends crucially on 
the level of a BIG, how a BIG is funded, and its interaction with 
the tax and social welfare system.
At the same time, predictions of a drop in women's labor 
force participation may also be overstated. Sociological and 
heterodox economic perspectives have emphasized broader 
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motivations other than income regarding labor force par-
ticipation, such as status, satisfaction, and other less tangible 
benefits. The incentive for unemployed persons to take up 
employment is most often measured using the "replacement 
rate" (RR)—the ratio between net income out of work and net 
income when in work, and research in this area reinforces the 
idea of work or employment being more than just income. 
Empirical data shows that there are many who choose to 
work, despite facing replacement ratios of close to or over 100 
percent (Callan et al., 2011). That is, they choose to be working, 
even if they could be close to or even better off financially by 
remaining unemployed. 
BIG advocates (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Van Parijs, 1995) further 
point out that existing systems of social security have sub-
stantial disincentives to work embodied in unemployment 
and poverty traps where low-income households face severe 
reductions in benefits for every dollar they earn. Combined 
with logistical problems, financial costs of entering work, and 
uncertainty regarding stability of employment, there is a huge 
incentive to forgo work in favor of benefits, if choosing one 
reduces income from the other. BIG reduces such disincen-
tives, thus potentially making the most vulnerable women 
better off, with greater rather than lesser incentive to engage 
in paid labor. This issue highlights the role of women's diver-
sity in creating ambiguous effects of BIG, with some women 
likely to be gainers and some losers under any reform (see also 
Robeyns, 2001). 
A second possible outcome of a BIG with respect to the 
reduction of gendered inequality is a related but distinct effect 
concerning the role of independent income in raising econom-
ic autonomy and/or control over household resources rather 
than material welfare per se. In a discussion of feminist theory 
and BIG, Zelleke (2011, p. 34) discusses "the ideal of autono-
my" not as "the equalisation of resources, opportunities or ca-
pabilities, but rather the guarantee of the minimal resources 
necessary for individuals to pursue their own ends consistent 
with their innate abilities and with a similar degree of auton-
omy from others over their own lives." Thus the key issue is 
not simply a redistribution of income in order to reduce in-
equalities in material welfare, but also to reduce inequalities of 
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power (Zelleke, 2011).
There is a large theoretical literature and accumulating em-
pirical evidence to suggest that in addition to, or even regard-
less of, material welfare gains, independent income provides 
a source of economic autonomy which, in turn, impacts bar-
gaining and power relations with the household. Differences 
between men and women in terms of their roles in household 
decision-making (particularly regarding income and large ex-
penditures) have been linked to their differences in terms of 
income, status, education, and ethnicity (Cantillon & Nolan, 
1998, 2001; Nyman & Reinikainen, 2007; Rake & Jayatilka, 
2002). An important distinction has also been made between 
high-level decisions on the allocation of resources to each area 
(food, clothing, household bills, holidays, etc.) and instrumen-
tal decisions regarding the management of the budget within 
each of these areas (Pahl, 1989). Several studies suggest that 
the woman usually engages in the management of household 
resources, while the overall allocative control and decision-
making power rests with the man (Lauer & Yodanis, 2011).
Differences in control over household finances are there-
fore important in their own right, as an indicator of power, 
and for the role they may play in producing and explaining 
differences in living standards. Differences in management are 
also important insofar as they reflect respective roles in deci-
sion-making and identify who carries the burden of respon-
sibility for stretching scarce resources. Several UK studies, 
using both small scale surveys and large nationally represen-
tative samples (Rake & Jayatilaka, 2002; Vogler, 1998; Vogler 
& Pahl, 1994), have explored different systems for manag-
ing household resources and their implications for the living 
standards of individual members. Rottman (1994), Cantillon, 
Gannon, and Nolan (2004) and Watson, Maître, & and Whelan 
(2013) used Irish data to examine this issue and also identi-
fied a number of distinct approaches to managing resources. 
The studies produced similar results: while joint financial 
decision-making is common among couples, in a significant 
proportion of couples the husband retains control in terms of 
major decisions, while the wife has the responsibility of man-
aging resources on a week-to-week basis. Further, the respon-
sibility for making resources stretch when money is tight falls 
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disproportionately on women.
A third possible effect is that, irrespective of any material 
benefit or even increased control over financial resources, a 
BIG could have a positive psychological impact on women's 
sense of self and well-being. Some of those studying BIG have 
pointed out that this could be a result of increased recogni-
tion or valuation of unremunerated work, in the sense that ac-
tivities outside the paid labor market are formally recognised 
as worthwhile (Robeyns, 2001). Alternatively, it could arise 
in terms of measures of psychological health and well-being 
where independent income provides a greater sense of control, 
as empirical studies within the intra-household literature have 
demonstrated (Cantillon & Moran, 2016; Kan & Laurie 2010; 
Walters, McDonough, & Strohschein, 2002). 
The fourth effect relates to the issue of inequalities in 
leisure time and participation in unpaid work. There is now 
a vast literature documenting disparities in time use between 
men and women which has specifically highlighted the greater 
participation of women in unpaid domestic and care work and 
the inequality of leisure time which results from this (Bianchi, 
Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012; Latshaw, 2011). 
BIG advocates have argued that unconditional cash ben-
efits can raise the status of work outside the labor market, as 
well as reduce economic pressure to create space for such ac-
tivity. For example, McKay (2005) and Zelleke (2011) argue 
that a BIG does not prioritize labor market participation at 
the expense of productive activity outside the labor market 
and therefore does not penalize individuals for engaging in it. 
There is a tendency to assume that this would lead to continued 
gender specialization; however, an unconditional, steady cash 
payment could theoretically reduce pressure on men as bread-
winners by providing a measure of financial security outside 
labor market income, allowing space for men to reduce their 
participation in the labor market and potentially to take on a 
greater share of traditionally feminine tasks (Bambrick, 2006). 
This could be heightened or strengthened via the psychologi-
cal effect: e.g., greater societal value placed on these activities 
could shape men's willingness to engage in such work. 
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Expanding the Evidence Base for a Basic Income
A key limiting factor in the BIG debate is a lack of robust 
evidence on potential effects and outcomes due to the fact that 
there are few real world examples to study. The closest and 
most famous example is the Permanent Fund Dividend in 
Alaska (see Widerquist & Howard, 2012). Since 1982, each in-
dividual Alaskan has received an unconditional annual grant 
funded from state oil revenue. The amount varies by year 
and is very modest (usually between $1000-1500 per person) 
and as such may be considered at best a partial basic income. 
However, there has been little systematic analysis of the effects 
of the dividend on the Alaskan population (for an overview of 
available evidence, see Goldsmith, 2012). 
In the absence of much real-world evidence on the effects 
of a BIG, many scholars have turned to evidence provided 
by a few experiments and pilot programs of a basic income 
as well as related alternatives, such as the Negative Income 
Tax (NIT). Although not technically a BIG as such, the most 
widely analyzed evidence comes from the NIT experiments in 
the U.S. and Canada. More recently there have been pilots in 
developing countries which have aimed to test the effective-
ness of unconditional cash transfers on alleviating poverty 
and other social goals, such as those in Nambia (Haarman & 
Haarman, 2012) and in India (Davala, Jhabvala, Standing, & 
Kapoor Mehta, 2015). 
There has also been a push to increase social scientific 
analysis of the potential effects of a BIG using methods such 
as laboratory experiments and attitudinal surveys, although 
to date there has been little advancement in this area (but see 
Haigner, Höchtl, Schneider, Wakolbinger, & Jenewein, 2012; 
Marx & Peeters, 2008). Economic modelling and microsimula-
tions of BIG reforms have been relatively more common, most 
of which focus on budget and labor force participation effects 
(e.g., Colombino, Locatelli, Narazani, & O'Donoghue, 2010; 
Gilroy, Heimann, & Schopf, 2013), although some also contain 
reference to differences among men and women within house-
holds (Callan et al., 2000). 
While this paper utilizes such evidence where relevant, it 
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also makes a contribution by including an underutilized source: 
universal child benefits. In the UK context, Child Benefit, at 
least until recently, has shared many key characteristics with 
a basic income, and has been referred to as a basic income for 
children (Torry, 2012; see also Levy, Matsaganis, & Sutherland, 
2013). The policy is a universal, largely unconditional (the con-
dition is that children be in full-time education) cash benefit, 
paid in steady (weekly or monthly) allotments. Further, while 
it is not fully individualized, it is paid to the primary caregiver, 
which in the vast majority of cases is a woman, and is therefore 
useful for understanding intra-household income inequalities 
because it increases the amount of disposable income for the 
person likely to have less labor market income. A BIG would 
enhance this effect, as income would be provided for both pro-
viders and recipients of care.
Thus, policy distance is minimized, especially compared to 
other commonly used proxies such as the NIT, which is means-
tested, not delivered as a cash benefit and is assessed at the 
household level. A key limitation of using the UK child benefit 
as a proxy is the low amount of the payment (currently £20.70/
week for eldest child, £13.70 for additional children), which is 
substantially below most proposals for a basic income. This 
is further exacerbated by the fact that it is only paid to one 
individual in the household, rather than to all. Similar child 
benefits exist in many other European countries (Levy et al., 
2013) as well as in Canada (Schirle, 2015). Reference is made to 
evidence from these countries where available. 
Another key source of evidence is the broader literature 
on intra-household inequalities, including the role of income/
economic differences, issues of control/power and patterns of 
household division of labor, which provide information on the 
incentive structure and processes which undergird assump-
tions/predictions about BIG effects with respect to gender in-
equality. Specifically, the article discusses the evidence base 
with regard to key areas of intra-household inequalities in 
income and expenditures, living standards, well-being, and 
time use.
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The Impact of a Basic Income on Intra-household 
Inequalities
Material Welfare
To what extent would a BIG be likely to raise women's ma-
terial welfare within the household? The question of women's 
independent income and, by extension, their material welfare, 
will depend in part on their labor force participation. In 
general, women's (especially married women's) labor market 
participation tends to be more elastic than men's, although this 
has decreased over time, for example, in the U.S. (Blau & Kahn, 
2007). Accordingly, discussions of the impact of a BIG on em-
ployment incentives have suggested that any negative effect 
is likely to be particularly pronounced for women. Evidence 
from Canada suggests that there is a negative effect on labor 
force participation for coupled mothers receiving child benefit, 
with the largest effects for those with lower levels of education 
(Schirle, 2015). However, there is a positive effect on single 
mothers (Schirle & Koebel, 2015). 
The most commonly cited evidence on this issue within 
the BIG literature is from the NIT experiments in the U.S. and 
Canada during the 1960s-1970s, which suggests that the largest 
labor force participation effects were on secondary earners 
such as students and married women—reducing labor market 
participation on average by 19% for U.S. married women and 
15% for single mothers. The effect was substantially less in the 
Canadian Mincome experiment (2-3%) but was still negative 
(see Widerquist, 2005). 
Economic models of BIG (rather than NIT) tend to dem-
onstrate less of a problem with labor market participation 
reduction, primarily due to the elimination of poverty traps 
associated with conditional or means-tested benefits, which 
are currently prevalent within many systems of social security 
(Colombino et al., 2010; Gilroy et al., 2013). Colombino and 
colleagues (2010) model the introduction of a BIG compared to 
other possible reforms (a means-tested guaranteed minimum 
income, workfare, participation income) in the UK, Denmark, 
Italy and Portugal. In general, they found gains to be made 
in all countries from shifting toward a BIG with progressive 
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taxation; however, in Italy and Portugal such a reform was as-
sociated with reductions in female labor participation rates, 
which was not the case in Denmark or in the UK, where it de-
pended on the level of the BIG. Consequently, there is reason to 
be concerned about reductions in at least some women's labor 
force participation following the introduction of a BIG, though 
for some women work incentives are likely to be higher fol-
lowing such a reform. 
The standard of living of the woman in the household is also 
related to her position in the labor market, not least because the 
level of her earnings has some effect on the household system 
adopted. Using Pahl's taxonomy of household money manage-
ment, Vogler found that women in full-time employment are 
more likely to be part of a pooled management or independent 
spheres system, whereas women with low-paid, part-time jobs 
are more likely to be involved in a whole wage management or 
allowance system (Vogler, 1994).These findings appear to sub-
stantiate Blood and Wolfe's (1960) resource theory of power, 
which posited that the relative income of each partner was 
related to his/her degree of power in the household. However, 
as women's participation in the labor market has predomi-
nantly been in terms of part-time or lower paid work, this 
cannot be identified as contributing to the equalization of roles 
and power within the household. Instead, as Vogler argues, 
women's over-representation in part-time work can be seen as 
"a way of increasing household income (and meeting employ-
ers' needs for labor) without upsetting the traditional division 
of labor between male breadwinners and female childbearers/
secondary earners" (1994, p. 226). Furthermore, since the extra 
money earned by women in part-time positions is often incor-
porated into the overall household consumption fund, this can 
have the effect of freeing up resources for the male's personal 
consumption, thus reinforcing rather than reducing the differ-
ential living standards of men and women. 
However, this type of analysis tells us little about the ma-
terial welfare of those who are not in paid employment, or 
whether receipt of an individualized non-market income like 
a BIG would benefit such individuals, leading to decreased in-
equality within the home. Studies of UK child benefit suggest 
that such benefits can improve women's material welfare. 
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Influential research by Lundberg et al. (1997) examined the 
shift from family allowance to child benefit in the 1970s, which 
changed how the funds were paid, transferring money from 
"the wallet to the purse," in order to assess whether there was 
a corresponding increase in women and children's consump-
tion. Specifically, they looked at expenditure on women's and 
children's clothing as an individualized indicator and found 
an increase in this type of consumption following the shift (see 
also Goode, Callender, & Lister, 1998). This was further sup-
ported by research by Ward-Batts (2008), which controlled for 
price changes in the goods under study and still found a shift 
in consumption patterns from those benefiting men primar-
ily to those benefiting women and children. However, inter-
views with parents claiming UK child benefit suggests that the 
money goes more toward improving children's welfare than 
mothers' (Farthing, 2012). This is less likely to be an issue for 
a BIG, however, as it is fully individualized such that there 
would be a payment for children as well as for each member 
of the couple.
Further, in one of the few microsimulations of a BIG to ex-
plicitly consider gendered inequality at the individual level, 
Callan et al. (2000) found evidence of a within-household redis-
tributive effect with gains for women. Specifically, under a BIG 
reform in Ireland, over 40% of women were estimated to have 
a large gain in individual incomes (more than £10 per week), 
compared with about 20% of men. In contrast, about half of 
the men were estimated to have a loss in individual income of 
more than £10 per week, while this was true for about 25% of 
women. Crucially, much of the redistribution took place within 
coupled relationships—spouses or partners. Household level 
or combined incomes showed very little differences between 
men and women. However, this was a static model and did 
not take into account potential behavioral change as a result 
of the introduction of a BIG. Furthermore, the simulations are 
based on 1994 data, which precede both the boom and bust of 
the Irish economy, the sharp rise in labor force participation 
rates for women, and the more recent closing of gender gaps 
in employment, unemployment, and wages in the aftermath 
of both the financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures 
introduced. 
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Economic Autonomy
A related but distinct effect is the potential role of a basic 
income in raising economic autonomy and/or control over 
household resources. Autonomy and control over household 
resources are partly important for contributions to mate-
rial welfare, as noted previously with regard to the relation-
ship between a woman's independent income and her living 
standards.
However, autonomy is arguably valuable in its own right. 
For example, recent research (Bennett & Sung, 2013) highlight-
ed the importance of financial autonomy (including economic 
independence, privacy in one's financial affairs and exercis-
ing agency with regard to personal and household spend-
ing) among low-income women in Britain. Further evidence 
from qualitative interviews regarding experiences of receiving 
Child Benefit in the UK is again relevant: mothers, in particu-
lar, pointed to the importance of having independent income 
via Child Benefit (even though it was a low sum) and not 
having to ask for money from their partners, which they found 
demeaning (Farthing, 2012). 
In fact, for some women, the prospect of economic autono-
my is so appealing that they may be willing to trade-off reduc-
tions in their absolute level of financial resources, for example, 
via less access to their partner's higher earnings. In a review 
of research on within-household distributions, Bennett (2013) 
devotes a section to debates about equal benefit versus autono-
my, noting that there has been a shift toward individualization 
of finances, at least in part due to the normative value placed 
on financial independence and autonomy. A study of Swedish 
couples, for example, demonstrated the importance that 
women, in particular, place on reducing their financial depen-
dence on their partners, even when this places them at a dis-
advantage due to their lower earnings (Nyman & Reinikainen, 
2007). This type of control, which connotes a sense of entitle-
ment to use funds as one wishes, is distinct from financial man-
agement of household resources, for which women are often 
responsible and is often perceived as a burden rather than as 
signifier of autonomy. 
This suggests that there could be merit in providing a 
BIG due to its contribution to feelings of economic autonomy, 
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even if its overall contribution to material welfare is low on its 
own (that is, where it is not coupled with paid employment). 
However, attention must be given to the method of deliv-
ery of a BIG if there is to be control in practice rather than on 
paper. This is one of the key arguments against implementing 
an income floor via a Negative Income Tax rather than a BIG, 
where an NIT is assessed and delivered jointly for a household 
rather than on an individual basis. Care must be taken that a 
BIG is understood as an individual entitlement and perhaps 
administrated in such a way as to ensure independent access–
similar perhaps to the delivery of Child Benefit (UK).
Psychological Effects and Well-being 
A third possible effect is that, irrespective of any material 
benefit or even increased autonomy, a BIG could raise psycho-
logical valuation of unremunerated work, in the sense that ac-
tivities outside the paid labor market are formally recognized 
as worthwhile (Robeyns, 2001). The idea that an independent 
income should be accessible, even to those outside the paid 
labor market, is a well-established feminist idea. Twentieth 
century feminist movements specifically called for wages for 
housework as a way of recognizing, monetarily, the produc-
tive work of the household.
Pahl's (1989) classic text Money & Marriage explored finan-
cial decision-making within UK households, noting that house-
wives receiving a family allowance did feel a sort of symbolic 
valuation for their unpaid work as a result of the monetary 
payment coming into the household. Similarly, more recent 
interviews with those receiving UK Child Benefit suggested 
some implicit evidence of psychological valuation, where par-
ticipants made reference to the hard work of caring for children 
and deserving an independent income for doing so (Farthing, 
2012).The feeling that income support acknowledges care as 
work is further supported by research on those receiving care-
giving allowances, although the level of payment is key, with 
small amounts perceived as signifying low value (Singleton & 
Fry, 2015).
It is unclear, however, that a BIG would have similar effects. 
First of all, if a BIG is set too low it could be perceived, as with 
caregiving allowances, as a signifier of low value, rather than 
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as recognition of important work. Second, unlike child benefits 
or caregiving allowances, BIG is, by design, neutral regarding 
purpose or activity (it is unconditional). Therefore, while it 
might raise psychological valuation via a societal recognition 
that there are worthwhile activities beyond paid employment 
in a general sense, by virtue of not specifically valuing any 
particular activity, such as care work, it is unclear whether it 
would have any sort of direct psychological effect on women 
who are performing such activities. 
However, another way of looking at the psychological 
impact of a basic income (or individual independent income), 
other than the potential valuation of previously unrecognized 
domestic and care work, is the impact of independent income 
on health and well-being. There have been some studies of the 
relationship between women's socio-economic status and their 
psychological health, which focused on the gendered division 
of financial control or gendered experience of financial strain 
within the household; an identifiable link was found between 
the division of expenditure responsibilities and psychological 
distress. One such study explored the relationship between 
psychological well-being and savings, investments, and debts 
(Kan & Laurie, 2010). It found that there was a growing in-
dependence in financial arrangements between couples, with 
investments and debts more likely to be individually held. 
Savings, on the other hand, were viewed as shared assets. 
In terms of psychological well-being, the authors found that 
men's psychological well-being was affected by their own 
levels of savings, investments, and debts rather than their part-
ners', while women's well-being was influenced by both their 
own levels and that of their partners. 
Rottman's (1994) study of income distribution looked at 
the relationship between the financial management system, 
the degree of sharing of resources and the psychological well-
being of men and women, as measured separately from the 
overall well-being of the household. He found that there was 
a statistically significant relationship between income sharing 
and levels of psychological distress, as well as feelings of fa-
talism. Sharing of income was associated with lower levels of 
psychological distress and lower levels of fatalism. The effects 
were found to be stronger for wives than for husbands. A more 
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recent study (Cantillon & Moran, 2016) suggests that wives 
faced with the burden of managing scarce financial resources 
suffered higher levels of psychological distress. Further, their 
research found that there is a significant negative relationship 
for wives between having an independent income and their fa-
talism scores. That is, an independent income has a significant 
beneficial effect on her levels of fatalism or feelings of pow-
erlessness. Further, the higher the independent income that 
accrues to the wife, the greater the positive impact on her psy-
chological health. This suggests that the contribution of a BIG 
to economic security could be especially psychologically ben-
eficial for low-income women who are responsible for making 
ends meet within the household.
Time Allocation: Leisure Time and Household/Care Work
The fourth effect relates to the issue of inequalities in time 
and participation in unpaid work. As noted, some BIG advo-
cates have argued that unconditional cash benefits can raise 
the status of work outside the labor market, as well as reduce 
economic pressure to create space for such activity, thus po-
tentially contributing to a reduction in time-based inequali-
ties between women and men in the home. Zelleke (2011, p. 
39) in particular argues that, while a BIG would not guarantee 
a shift in men's participation in unpaid work, it would "de-
crease the costs to men of doing so, and would increase their 
opportunities to break out of the gendered distribution that 
confines men to paid employment-centric models of contribu-
tory citizenship."
While this argument makes sense logically, existing evi-
dence on shifts in patterns of time spent in household and care 
work suggests that opportunities for men to decrease their 
time in paid employment do not necessarily correspond to in-
creases in time spent in other forms of work rather than leisure. 
One of the great demographic shifts over the past half century 
has been women's increased participation in paid employ-
ment. This was optimistically viewed as a gender revolution 
in which the division of labor between men and women would 
be substantially reduced, with men taking on a greater share 
of the household labor as women take on a greater share of 
employment labor. Yet, persistent inequalities seem to suggest 
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that the revolution 'stalled' (England, 2010).
While men have increased their time spent in household 
and care work over time (Gershuny, Bittman, & Brice, 2005; 
Van Hook, Brown, & Bean, 2006), it has not been proportional 
to women's increased time in paid employment, nor crucially, 
to their increased income (Brines, 1994). In fact, much of the 
reduction in the disparity in men's and women's time spent in 
household tasks has come as a result of women doing less and/
or 'outsourcing' those services by hiring domestic workers or 
purchasing time-saving appliances, rather than as a redistri-
bution among members of the household (Bittman, England, 
Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; Gupta, 2007). This suggests 
that increasing women's income via a BIG may well lead to 
further expenditures on childcare services and other means of 
reducing women's own time in unpaid activities, rather than 
an increase in men's unpaid work. However, Vollenweider 
(2013) points out that the supply of domestic services may well 
fall (or prices may rise) in the presence of BIG providing finan-
cial security for low-income workers currently providing such 
services. Under those circumstances, household redistribution 
may be more likely.
Conclusion
While basic income has been championed as a reform for 
reducing inequality between households, it can also be expect-
ed to have an impact on inequality within households. An in-
dividual entitlement to an income floor better accommodates 
core feminist insights about the "black box" of the household 
and possible inequalities between men and women in coupled 
relationships, than do some policy reform ideas, such as the 
Negative Income Tax, which persists in the assumption that all 
households conform to a unitary model. 
The evidence base for a BIG, however, is currently limited, 
and as such, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the likely 
impact of a BIG on within-household inequalities. Our analy-
sis of existing BIG pilots/schemes, proxies for a BIG (e.g., uni-
versal child benefits) and the broader evidence base on intra-
household inequalities in income and expenditures, living 
standards, well-being and time use, suggests that the impact 
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of a BIG on gendered inequalities within the household is 
ambiguous. 
A BIG seems most likely to have a direct effect on women's 
material welfare by reducing intra-household inequalities with 
respect to independent income. Given that previous research 
has shown that access to an independent income has important 
implications for improving women's living standards within 
the household, a BIG could be expected to improve at least 
some women's living standards, particularly those who oth-
erwise would have no or little independent income. It is also 
likely to have a direct effect on psychological well-being and 
feelings of economic autonomy, again via the guarantee of an 
independent income, regardless of labor force participation. 
Here studies of child benefits paid to primary caregivers are 
telling, as interviews with recipients demonstrated that they 
are often valued as independent income (e.g., Farthing, 2012). 
Discussions of policy reforms usually focus on material 
outcomes, yet the symbolic or non-material impact should be 
recognized: economic autonomy, psychological valuation and 
feelings of control are of value for their own sake, irrespec-
tive of material welfare. Additionally, the individual nature 
of a BIG is, on its own, a powerful statement about women 
(and children) as citizens in their own right, not as dependents 
within a household. Advocates find the radical nature of BIG 
in its symbolism as much as (if not more so than) the actual 
financial gains. This perhaps explains why there has been only 
limited attention to the institutional details: the point is a para-
digm shift in how citizenship is understood, in addition to the 
more limited question of how to guarantee a particular level 
of welfare.
Nevertheless, if the amount of a BIG is too low, it could 
leave women, in particular, financially deprived, especially if 
coupled with decreased labor force participation, which may 
be the case for at least some women. This issue rightly gives 
some feminists pause and is an important arena for future re-
search and an issue which should be included in any specific 
BIG reform proposal. Further, a BIG seems less likely to have 
a direct effect on reducing inequalities with regard to time al-
location, specifically leisure time and time spent in perform-
ing household and care work, although an indirect effect is 
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possible.
There is a complex link between income/financial re-
sources, bargaining power, gender ideologies, and time allo-
cation which is still not fully understood. So while BIG may 
have a straightforward income effect, for example, it is less 
clear that changes in income will also lead to changes in bar-
gaining power which is important for negotiating equality in 
other aspects, such as household/care work and leisure-time. 
Some evidence suggests that "gender trumps money" in such 
negotiations (Bittman et al., 2003) in which case a BIG could 
be expected to have limited effect on its own—that is, in the 
absence of further cultural shifts in social norms about men's 
and women's roles.
This points to the broader issue of how any impact of a 
BIG also depends on interaction with the broader cultural 
and policy context regarding gender relations; BIG on its own 
cannot be expected to bring into effect a gender revolution— 
deep-seated change will require more than the introduction of 
an income floor. Going forward, the key issue will be how to 
capture the benefits of a BIG, especially as it pertains to in-
creasing women's autonomy, while reducing any potentially 
negative effects on women's welfare, which means greater at-
tention to interactions between a BIG and other gender equal-
ity proposals. In particular, this will require a higher quality 
evidence base on the gendered effects of a BIG, in addition to 
philosophical discussions about the normative implications of 
a BIG for gender equality. Much of the empirical analyses of a 
BIG have focused on the question of labor market incentives, 
but there is more to understand about the gendered impact 
of a BIG, specifically whether, in practice, it would have the 
implied effect on women's economic autonomy and living 
standards within the household, and whether this, in turn, 
would lead to the reduction of inequalities of power between 
men and women in coupled relationships.
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